Abstract-In this paper, recent results in game theory and stochastic approximation are brought together to study the problem of femto-to-macrocell cross-tier interference. The main result of this paper is an algorithm which reduces the impact of interference of femtocells over the existing macrocells. Such algorithm relies on the observations of the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of all active communications in both macro and femtocells when they are fed back to the corresponding base stations. Based on such observations, femto base stations learn the probability distributions over the feasible transmit configurations (frequency band and power levels) such that a minimum time-average SINR can be guaranteed in the macrocells, at the equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce the concept of logit equilibrium (LE) and present its interpretation in terms of the trade-off faced by femtocells when experimenting several actions to discover the network, and taking the action to maximize their instantaneous performance. Finally, numerical results are given to validate our theoretical findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a new type of indoor Base Station (BS), called femtocell, has gained the attention of the industry [1] due to the enormous benefits it brings to both end-users and network operators. For instance, end-users can enjoy better signal qualities due to the reduced distance between the transmitter and the receiver, resulting in higher throughputs, power and battery savings. From the operator's point of view, femtocells will extend the indoor coverage, enhance system capacity, and share the spectrum in a more efficient manner [2] . However, these benefits are not easy to accomplish, and there are challenges that mobile operators must address before successfully deploying femtocell networks. Among these challenges, there is the cross-tier interference between macrocells and femtocells which highly impact the qualityof-service (QoS) of the already existing networks. Therefore, distributed and efficient self-organization strategies need to be designed in order to make the deployment of femtocell networks feasible. Many results exist along this direction, e.g., see [3] , [5] among others. In [3] and [5] , a Q-learning based algorithm was investigated in the context of network selection for heterogeneous wireless networks, and channel selection in multi-user cognitive radios, respectively. In [6] and [7] , a reinforcement-learning framework based on Qlearning was studied for interference mitigation among femtocells. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned works often require information exchange among transmitters, which represents a non-affordable increment of signaling messages.
In this paper, we propose a fully decentralized method for interference minimization/mitigation from the femtocell BS The authors would like to thank the Finnish funding agency for technology and innovation, Elektrobit, Nokia and Nokia Siemens Networks for supporting this work. This work has been performed in the framework of the ICT project ICT-4-248523 BeFEMTO, which is partly funded by the EU.
(FBS) to the macrocell user equipments (MUEs), i.e., our interest focuses on the downlink interaction between femtoand macrocell systems, as shown in Fig. 1 . The underlying assumption in our work is that the feedback messages from MUEs to their corresponding macrocell base station containing their instantaneous signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) can be decoded by all FBSs 1 . The repetitive observation of the SINR is used by the FBS to dynamically configure how often different frequency bands are used such that, a minimum time-average SINR level can be guaranteed to the MUEs. Our proposal combines recent results in game theory, learning theory, and stochastic approximation to address such an issue. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system and game model are presented. Section III describes how femtocell base stations can build a reliable image of the average state of the network based on noisy observations of the SINR of the active user terminals in the downlink. Section IV describes the distributed learning algorithm for interference mitigation, which is the main result of this paper. Numerical results are presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. MODELS

A. Notations
Boldface lower case and lower case symbols represent vectors and scalars. Given a random variable z, the expectation with respect to z is denoted by E z [.] . The indicator function is denoted by 1 {condition} and it equals 1 (resp. 0) when condition is true (resp. false). Given a finite set A, (A) represents the set of all probability distributions over the elements of the finite set A. Let the vector e 
B. System Model
Consider a set of M = {1, . . . , M} macrocell base stations (MBS) each one operating over an exclusive fixed frequency band and serving their respective macrocell user equipments (MUEs) using a time division multiple access (TDMA) policy. At each time interval, each MBS serves one of its corresponding MUE aiming to guaranteing a minimum time-average SINR over their communication duration. We assume that there exists a set S = {1, . . . , S} of S frequency bands over which MBS can operate. Let Γ the minimum time-average SINR offered by MBS m over its corresponding fixed frequency band. Consider now a set K = {1, . . . , K} of K femtocells underlaying the M -cell Sfrequency band macrocell system. Each femtocell can use any of the available frequency bands to serve its corresponding femto user equipment (FUE) as long as it does not induce a lower time-average SINR than the minimum required by the MUE, i.e., Γ
. At each time interval, each FBS serves one FUE over one of the available channels following a TDMA policy. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , ∞} be a discrete time index. For all
1,j,k (t) represents the channel realization between MBS k and MUE j over channel s at time t.
4,j,k (t) represents the channel realization between FBS k and FUE j over channel s at time t. Denote by h(t) the vector of all channel realizations at time t. All channel realizations, i.e., each component of h(t), are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) following a probability distribution which is a parameter of the network. Let the finite set denoted by H be the set of all possible vectors h(t), for all t > 0. Finally, channel realizations at time t are independent of those at time t − 1, for all t > 0. Let p k,max and p 0,m , with k ∈ K and m ∈ M, be the maximum transmit power of FBS k and MBS m, respectively.
is the transmit power of femtocell k over frequency band s at time t. All FBSs are assumed to only transmit on one frequency band at each time t at a given power level not exceeding p k,max . Let L k ∈ N be the number of discrete power levels of FBS k, i.e.,
the power allocation (PA) vector when FBS transmits over channel s at power level . Denote also by q
0,m (t) be the SINR of the MUE in the macrocell m at time t. Let also the set M s ⊂ M, with s ∈ S, be the set of MBS using channel s. Then, we can write that 
C. Game Theoretic Model
The interference minimization problem described in the previous section can be modeled by a sequence of strategic games played at different states, e.g., channel realizations. Let us denote by G(h(t)) = (K, {A k } k∈K , {φ} k∈K ) the static strategic game and let us denote by G = {G(h(t))} t>0 the game where at each time t, the game G(h(t)) is played, with t ∈ {1, . . . , ∞}. We describe in detail both formulations.
1) Short Term Formulation: Let us describe the network during the interval from t − 1 to t by the game G(h(t))
Here, K represents the set of FBS in the network. For all k ∈ K, the set of actions of FBS k is the set of power allocation vectors, i.e., A k = {q
At each time t > 0 and for all k ∈ K, FBS k chooses its action from the finite set A k following a probability dis-
is the probability that femtocell k plays action
where
In the following, we describe the long-term game G, and we introduce the method which each FBS uses to choose the probability distribution π k (t), at each time t.
2) Long-Term Formulation:
The long-term behavior of the network is modeled by the succession of static strategic games G = {G (h(t))} t 0 . This succession produces a game G = {G(h(t))} t 0 , where at each stage t the game G(h(t)) is played assuming that the network is described by the vector h(t). According to the system model, the actual state of the network h(t) follows a Markov chain with transitions following the rule,
Here, π h , for all h ∈ H, are parameters obtained from previous channel modeling studies.
The game G = {G(h(t))} t 0 proceeds in infinitely many stages. At each stage t ∈ {0, . . . , ∞}, FBSs choose their corresponding actions p 1 (t), . . . , p K (t). When doing so, each FBS k observes a noisy sampleφ k (t) of the corresponding instantaneous interference minimization metric
is the realization at time t of a random variable
which represents the additive noise on the observation of the instantaneous performance φ(t) when FBS k plays action q
Our behavioral assumption is that all FBS are interested in choosing the probability distribution π k (t) ∈ (A k ) to optimize the time-average interference minimization metric at each time t > 0, i.e.,φ k (t), which is calculated empirically based on the observationsφ k (t) as follows,
To choose the optimal probability distribution π k (t), the FBS relies on estimations of the time-average interference minimization metric obtained from each of its actions. For
, be the estimation of time-average interference minimization metric obtained by playing action q
. This estimation is calculated as follows,
where, T k,q
(t) for all k ∈ K, it is used to determine the optimal probability distribution π k (t) = π k,q
For doing so, we define the function β k : R N k → (A). Note that the probability distribution β k φ k (t) must take into consideration that, FBSs ought to try different actions such that the estimation vectorφ k (t) is improved at each time t, but also FBSs must optimize their respective interference minimization metric. In the following, we present the existing trade-off between both goals which might appear at a first glance as two antagonic processes.
III. EXPLORATION VS. PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION As shown in Sec II-C, all FBSs face a trade-off between optimizing their time-average utility by taking the action that does it at each time t, and trying out different actions so as to improve the estimation of the time-average interference mitigation metric obtained with each action. This implies that a reasonable behavioral rule would be to choose the actions which yield high payoffs more likely than actions yielding low payoffs, but in any case, always letting a non-null probability of playing any of the actions. Following the results in [9] , [10] , the behavioral rule described above can be modeled by the probability distribution β k (φ k (t)) satisfying,
where H represents the Shannon entropy function. In general, given a probability measure π 1 , ..., π N over a set of N elements, it follows that:
For all k ∈ K, the parameter κ k > 0 represents the interest of FBS k to choose other actions rather than the optimal one in order to improve the time-average interference minimization metric.
The unique solution to the right hand side of the optimization problem in (8) is written as:
where for all k ∈ K and for all
with strict inequality regardless of the estimation vectorφ k (t), with t > 0. Equation (11) is known in the game theoretic jargon as smooth best response [8] and implies a different concept of equilibrium with respect to the classical Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium, known as logit equilibrium or Boltzmann-Gibbs equilibrium [13] - [14] is defined as follows,
Definition 1: (Logit Equilibrium): Consider the game G = {G(h(t))} t 0 . The mixed strategy profile
where the
is the expected interference minimization metric, i.e., for all k ∈ K and for all
Note that Def. 1 implies a fixed point equation as in the case of the classical Nash equilibrium [11] , e.g., let
Thus, if π * is a logit equilibrium then, π * = β (π * ). It is also important to remark that when κ k → 0, the resulting probability distribution approaches the best response (BR) correspondence. First, let us define the best response correspondence as follows:
Definition 2: (Best Response Correspondence): Consider the game G = {G(h(t))} t 0 . For all k ∈ K, the best response correspondance in pure strategies
Now, we show how both smooth best response (11) and the best-response (13) are related when the perturbation (entropy term in (8)) vanishes.
Remark 1 implies that as long as the perturbation vanishes, the mixed strategies obtained by using the smooth bestresponse approach a uniform probability distribution over all the actions of the best response at a given time t.
Conversely to the vanishing perturbation case, when κ k → ∞, the resulting probability distribution approaches the uniform probability distribution over all the set of feasible frequency-bands and power-levels sets. In the following section, we introduce a novel technique for achieving LE for a given set of constants κ 1 , . . . , κ K .
IV. ACHIEVING THE LOGIT EQUILIBRIUM (LE)
In this section, we focus on the decentralized procedure used by FBSs to achieve a logit equilibrium for a given constant set of parameters κ k , with k ∈ K. We present the main result of this paper in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Achieving the LE): Consider the game
where,φ k (0) ∈ R N k and π k (0) ∈ (A k ) are arbitrary initializations and λ and α are learning rates chosen such that:
< +∞, and,
Then, both learning processes in (15) converge for all k ∈ K, and it holds that,
The proof of Prop. 1 follows the same steps of the proof of Prop. 3 in [10] and can be described in three steps. First, the processesφ 1 (t), . . . ,φ K (t) and the processes π 1 (t), . . . , π K (t) can be written as two stochastic approximation (SA) algorithmsφ(t) and π(t) by stacking them as a single vectors. Second, both SA algorithms satisfy the standard conditions to approximate them by two ordinary differential equations (ODE) [12] . Finally, using (18), it can be assumed that the processφ(t) sees the process π(t) as almost timeinvariant, and the process π(t) sees the processφ(t) as always calibrated to the current value of the former. Applying this reasoning to the asymptotic analysis of the ODEs leads to the proof of Prop. 1.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Let us consider one macrocell per frequency band and assume S = 4 available frequency bands, i.e., M = S = 4. The macrocell system is underlaid with K = 2 femtocells. We assume that femtocells have L = 3 transmit power levels and the average signal-to-noise ratio for the macro-and femtocells are 20 dB and 10 dB per frequency band, respectively.
=20dBs. The minimum SINR of the macrocells are given by Γ 0 = (8, 9, 12, 13) dB. The interference minimization/minimization metric adopted in this numerical example is the following:
This metric at a given instant t is different from zero only if all the MBSs satisfy at time t the minimum SINR level required for their own communications. The non-zero value represents the sum of the achieved SINR of all the FBS in the system. Hence, as long as all MBSs see their QoS requirement satisfied, FBSs obtain a positive reward. This models a certain altruism from the behavior of the FBSs which sacrifice their performance to guarantee the QoS of the macrocell system. Many other interference minimization functions can be devised to model the problem depending on particular features of the network. However this is out of the scope of this paper.
In Figure 2 , the evolution of the probability distribution over the set of actions taken by both FBSs is shown. As time goes by, FBS k = 1 increases the probability to transmit with the maximum power level on frequency band s = 1, while the probability of transmitting on other bands decreases. On the other hand, the probability that FBS k = 2 transmits with maximum transmit power level on carrier s = 2 increases with time, whereas the probabilities of transmitting over the other frequency bands decrease. It can also be seen that although femtocells do not communicate with each other, they coordinate their access to the spectrum by using different frequency bands with very high probability. Note also that s = 1 and s = 2 are the frequency bands where the corresponding MBS demands the lowest SINR level. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the corresponding ergodic transmission rate for both FBS. Finally, the evolution of the ergodic transmission rate of the macrocells is shown in Figure 4 . Clearly, all requirements are satisfied for the macrocell system. VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK In this paper, the cross-tier interference mitigation was studied in the framework of cognitive femtocells. Here, the behavior of femtocells aiming to avoid interference over the existing macrocells has been tackled using the fact that SINR messages fed-back from the end user terminals to their corresponding base stations can be decoded by all femtocells. Based on those observations, the behavior of femtocells is modeled by a smooth best response with respect to their expected interference minimization metric. This behavioral rule has been shown to lead the network to converge towards a logit equilibrium, where FBSs perfectly balance their willingness of experimenting several actions to discover the network, and adopting the actions for performance optimization. In our future work, we will investigate the possibility of improving the convergence speed as well as studying other learning mechanisms in the context of femtocell networks.
